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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the past two decades, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has enlarged several 
times to include a number of new countries. The first two case studies that are analyzed within 
this paper include key countries that were added in the 1999 and 2004 rounds of NATO 
enlargement: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The third case study takes a closer look at 
two countries, Ukraine and Georgia, that sought to become members of NATO but were denied 
Membership Action Plans (MAPs) because of Russian discontent and military intervention. It is 
questionable if Russia will use military force to disrupt the territorial sovereignty of future 
prospective NATO candidate countries. This paper aims to identify the trend between countries 
seeking NATO membership and Russian intervention within these countries. Poland joined 
NATO in 1999, and much to Moscow’s dislike, NATO’s borders expanded farther into Eastern 
Europe. The Baltic States, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, joined NATO in 2004, pushing the 
NATO border right against Russia’s northwestern front. This gave western alliances the ability to 
host military operations through NATO on the Russian border. It is apparent that Moscow has 
done everything in its power to prevent more countries that share a border with Russia from 
joining NATO. Only three months after the Bucharest Summit in 2008, Russia invaded two 
territories in Georgia. After the pro-Russian president in Ukraine was ousted in 2014, Russia 
invaded Eastern Ukraine and annexed the Crimean Peninsula. In order to be offered a MAP, the 
candidate country must have complete sovereignty over its territory. By invading key points 
within both Georgia and Ukraine, Russia was delaying their ability to become members of the 
security alliance. It is apparent that there is a connection between increased NATO collaboration 
with countries that border Russia, and military action taken upon those countries by Russia.  
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INTRODUCTION TO NATO ENLARGEMENT AND RUSSIAN RESPONSE 
 
Thesis and Main Argument 
 
The research question that I answer within this paper is: Why are relations between 
NATO and Russia degrading, and how can further conflict between potential candidate states 
and Russia be prevented? My argument is that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
cannot continue on its path of enlargement if it aims to continue any working relationship with 
Russia. Expanding the membership of NATO to include Central European countries and the 
Baltic states alarmed Russia, and the possible addition of other countries, such as Ukraine and 
Georgia, is seen by Russia as a direct threat to their national security. Though NATO seeks to 
solve grander problems like international terrorism, it still serves a purpose in protecting its 
member states from outside threats. Within this paper, I intend to discuss both Poland and the 
Baltic States joining NATO, possible candidate countries receiving MAPs, and the realities that 
the international community will face with regard to further NATO enlargement. 
My hypothesis is that if NATO continues on its path of complete European enlargement, 
there will be an increase of conflicts between Russia and potential NATO candidates. Russia 
sees further NATO expansion as a threat to its national security, and a malicious attempt to 
negate its influence in the surrounding regions. Even though if NATO conducted another round 
of enlargement, it would be difficult to do so based on an underlying factor: Russia’s desire to 
remain a regional superpower. Some of the current countries that are being vetted for NATO 
membership are Georgia and Ukraine. These states would provide NATO with an enormous 
advantage in the region because of their geographic location, and shared borders with Russia. 
Though this may be the case, it is also in Russia’s interest for these states to not become a part of 
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NATO. With these countries remaining non-member states of NATO, Russia is able to retain a 
high level of influence among them. In addition, Russia’s goal of retaining its regional hegemon 
status would be made a reality if it were able to form a structure similar to the one it possessed 
before the fall of the Soviet Union; the Warsaw Pact. Within this paper, I will analyze the 
aforementioned aspects of Russia – NATO relations, and conclude with the possibilities of what 
the international order will look like, given NATO enlargement continues or halts. 
The variables that are present within this situation are as follows. The independent 
variables of the enlargement process include candidate countries willingness to join the security 
alliance and NATO’s intentions, regarding enlargement. Dependent variables in the situation 
include the Russia’s reaction to the enlargement process based on geography and its relationship 
to the state, and the path that will be taken after the initial process to expand NATO is suggested. 
Within the body of this paper, I will identify several variables, connect their relationship with 
real world events, identify the possible outcomes of enlargement, and Russia’s reaction to the 
potential enlargement process. 
The relationships between the variables mentioned are not black and white, and often will 
become interconnected. Russia has grown aggravated by the enlargement process that NATO has 
been conducting since 1999. They feel cheated and threatened, as NATO first stood to serve as a 
counter weight to the Warsaw Pact. Though it serves to also combat global issues, such as 
international terrorism, it still acts as a security alliance that jeopardizes Russia’s ability to exert 
influence in the surrounding regions. Throughout this paper, I will analyze the relationships 
between variables regarding Russia, NATO, and the international structure. 
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It’s difficult to assess whether or not the relationship of each variable is positive or 
negative. Though for the most part, the relationship regarding NATO enlargement and 
diplomatic relations between NATO member states, potential candidates, and Russia, is a 
negative one. If NATO enlargement occurs against Russia’s will, the state is bound to react 
poorly. This brings to light an interesting question: is NATO enlargement worth aggravating 
Russia? 
Topic Significance 
 
This topic is particularly significant because of the rising tensions between NATO and 
Russia, the recent events that have transpired in Ukraine and Georgia, and the intention NATO 
has of expanding. NATO’s enlargement process serves as a threat to Russia’s foreign policy 
interests and in order to prevent future conflicts from occurring between NATO, candidate states, 
and Russia, the decision to continue or temporarily halt NATO expansion must be decided upon. 
The theoretical importance of this topic relates to the possibility of future conflict 
occurring in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Asia. As seen in the past decade, Russia 
will act accordingly to preserve its interests in the surrounding regions. In order for Europe and 
the surrounding regions to remain secure, a decision regarding future enlargement processes 
must be made. 
The policy importance of the topic stems directly from a desire to prevent future conflicts 
and the degradation of relations between NATO and Russia. The foreign policy initiative of 
enlargement directly effects NATO’s relationship with Russia in either a positive or negative 
way. If the enlargement process continues, relations with Russia will degrade. If the enlargement 
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process is halted (with regard to states that border Russia), then relations with Russia will mostly 
likely elevate in a positive manner. 
Literature Review 
 
The following includes the main points of articles that have been written about the topic 
at hand: Russia – NATO Relations. Within this literature review are articles from journals that 
contain information relevant to Poland, The Baltics, Ukraine, Georgia, Russia, the enlargement 
process of NATO, and factual information about NATO and Russia. This includes a look at the 
opinions and research done by other scholars with relation to the information I have collected to 
write this paper. 
(1979) Poland's Preparation for World War Two1: Within this article, Peszke talks about 
Poland’s preparation for World War Two. He discusses why Poland fought unlike any other 
country in Europe, and the historical relevance to fighting off foreign invaders. This journal is 
instrumental to gaining a background knowledge of Poland during the prewar era. In order to 
analyze the power dynamic between NATO, Poland, and Russia, it’s necessary to first 
understand the pretext that Poland had to security alliances in the 20th century. 
(1995) Partnership for Peace and Beyond2: Borawski discusses NATO enlargement and 
the Partnership for Peace program within this article. Written in 1995, this work was made only a 
few years before the round of NATO enlargement with Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary. This document brings up interesting points about adding Central European countries 
into the security alliance, and expanding the Partnership for Peace program. This work 
specifically contains information within the PfP, such as the ability for countries to tailor the 
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program to their needs. The author also mentions that active participation in the Partnership for 
Peace will shape NATO expansionism for years to come. 
(1995) Russian Opposition to NATO Expansion3: In this article, Lieven expands upon 
Russian concerns that revolve around NATO expansionism. An important piece of information 
within this work is Russia’s expected response to including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic within NATO. American diplomats assured Russia that including these countries into 
the security alliance would not be with malicious intent toward Russia. However, it is obvious 
that adding these countries directly threatens Russia’s ability to remake a similar structure to that 
of the Soviet Union. This work will be used to back up the idea that NATO is a pivotal way for 
the United States to assert its influence in Eastern Europe. 
(1995) The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion4: Kamp discusses NATO expansionism and 
the negative attributes that can come from its occurrence within this article. While countries in 
Eastern Europe urge their membership status be expedited, the author raises several important 
questions about expansion eastward. These questions include points such as the possible grantee 
of security from aggravators, nuclear weapons dilemmas, and Russia’s reaction to an eastward 
expansion. One of the main points of discussion in this piece is the implication of invoking 
Article 5. Are members of the alliance ready to assist in military combat and aid if a threat arises 
and affects a member state? 
(1996) Reforming NATO5: The author, Kaiser, discusses the path that NATO will take 
for the years to come in this article. The aspects of deterrence are brought to light, mentioning 
the ability for NATO to combat potential post-Soviet aggression within Eastern Europe. In 
addition, this journal talks about the ability for NATO to promote democracy, act as a peace 
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stabilizer, and become a mechanism to establish a U.S. led international order. Kaiser also brings 
up the challenges that NATO will face, such as continued expansion and the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. Within this piece, information regarding the implications of expansion are 
touched upon. This journal was written before the wave of expansion that included Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, and the insight the author provides for the consequences of adding 
those countries is invaluable. 
(1998) Nattering NATO Negativism? Reasons Why Expansion May Be a Good Thing6: 
In this article, Ball touches upon very important topics that surround NATO and Central Europe. 
This section particularly highlights the positive contributions that NATO expansionism holds for 
European countries that could be threatened by an aggressive Russian foreign policy. The author 
argues that NATO expansionism could counter Russian revisionism, and could benefit non-
NATO states. What the author means by this is that NATO expanding to include more European 
countries would deter Russia from rebuilding a multi-state empire similar to that of the Soviet 
Union. In addition, non-member states would benefit from expansionism, for instance Ukraine, 
because if Poland is a member of NATO, Russia would be less likely to outwardly provoke 
Ukraine militarily due to fears of Polish assistance (and thus NATO military assistance). 
(1999) Poland — The Road to 19897: Within in his article, Raymond discusses the 
difficulties that Poland had during its time in the Soviet Union, as well as its evolution from a 
member of the Soviet Union to a sovereign country. Raymond highlights the ways in which 
Poland received outside assistance, such as Radio Free Europe, and how the Polish population 
became increasingly nationalistic. The author does an incredible job of describing Poland’s time 
in the Soviet Union, and the measures that were taken to transition into a capitalist country. This 
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journal will be particularly helpful to reference when I write the section within the first chapter 
about Poland’s history and relationship with Europe after World War Two. 
(2000) Reviewed Work: The Future of NATO8: Enlargement, Russia, and European 
Security by Charles-Philippe: In this article, Baev reviews David’s “the Future of NATO: 
Enlargement, Russia, and European Security.” This work primarily focuses on the debates on 
NATO enlargement, with regard to Western and Central European views. In addition, the work 
that the author is reviewing provides a powerful insight on the reasons Poland sought to join 
NATO.  
(2002) Uneasy Expansion: NATO and Russia9: In this article, Franekova particularly 
discusses the implications of NATO expansionism with relation to including smaller Eastern 
European countries into the alliance. While the security alliance is concerned primarily with 
security and stability of countries that are not large enough to protect themselves, NATO tries 
primarily to concern itself with the collective security of Europe. This, however, implies that the 
NATO border will move closer to Russia’s western border. This is especially seen with NATO’s 
inclusion of the Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.  
(2004) Expansion of NATO: Russia's Dilemma10: This article discusses the importance of 
NATO in multiple spheres: It’s involvement with creating a more secure Europe and its purpose 
in fighting threats such as terrorism. The author, Gidadhubli, brings up that NATO continued to 
be relevant in the sphere of combating terrorism and other avenues other than protecting 
countries from a more aggressive Russia, however Russia views NATO to be completely 
irrelevant if not to prevent the country from gaining regional influence. Gidahubli mentions that 
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NATO and Russia have conflicting views regarding expansionism, and the conflicting views 
could inevitably result in rising tensions. 
(2010) NATO’s Final Frontier: Why Russia Should Join NATO11: Kupchan discusses the 
necessity of finding a common ground between Russia and NATO. As written, Russia is an 
essential part of dealing with global problems such as counterterrorism, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, 
energy security, the stabilization of Afghanistan, and energy security. The expansion of NATO 
makes Russia’s placement within the international community more pressing. Russia outlined 
NATO as a primary external threat in their 2010 military doctrine. The U.S. continues to see and 
use NATO as a tool for power projection in Europe, however the European members see the 
military alliance as a tool to build a stable, peaceful, and unified Europe. The author list five 
arguments as to why Russia should be integrated into NATO. The first being that Russia’s 
inclusion would create collective security through integration. The second argument is that its 
inclusion would restore the transatlantic European link the U.S. needs as a partner, considering 
how slow the EU moves on matters of defense. The third argument is that Russia’s inclusion 
would allow for a peaceful integration of Ukraine and Georgia, without a crisis in Moscow. The 
fourth argument is that Russia’s inclusion would ensure the alliances control of evolution in the 
Transatlantic space. The fifth argument is that Russia’s inclusion would allow for the alliance to 
broaden its scope; the alliance would be able to expand its horizons past its own neighborhood. 
Though NATO would be running a strategic risk by including Russia, the security alliance runs a 
greater risk by not including the state. 
(2010) The two-headed Russian eagle, European partner or outsider12: The author of this 
article, Lenzi, talks about the history of Russia’s relations with NATO, and the interactions the 
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state has had with its neighbors (future NATO countries). The article portrays that the time has 
come for a triangular alliance between the U.S., mainland Europe, and Russia. This would 
essentially link Euro-American and Euro-Asian geopolitics, something that should have been a 
priority after World War 2 and, later, the Cold War. The author talks about how it is too 
ambitious to create a new alliance or structure. The alliance and relationship between Russia and 
NATO should be “a garden that’s supported, steadily tended, and grown organically through 
accumulation. 
(2011) Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Beyond13: A Menu of Russia’s Policy 
Strategies: Makarychev discusses the idea of a Multipolar and Unipolar system in relation to the 
East and West within this article. The multipolar approach of viewing the international 
community are in direct contradiction to the Western “collective unilateralism” view. This would 
include an all-encompassing security alliance (one that would include Russia in NATO). Though 
this sounds like a framework for the international community that could work, it would hardly 
result in the idea of equality of all participants in the international system. The author doesn’t 
address this point, but if Russia were to join NATO at this point, the state would be part of a 
much gander, Western led coalition, and would most likely be subordinate to Western dictation. 
As mentioned in a previous article discussed in this excerpt, the requirements and implications of 
joining NATO would need to be altered before Russia joins a Western led security alliance 
(completing a Transatlantic security alliance). 
(2011) The U.S. Debate on NATO Nuclear Deterrence14: Yost directly addresses the 
nuclear stockpile within Europe, how it should be decreased (if at all), and the terms of which 
Russia will be involved with creating a denuclearized Europe within this article. It’s the long-
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term policy that responsibility agreements, such as shared nuclear weapons, contribute to 
deterrence prevention and provide assurance to allies of U.S. commitments. It’s from this stance 
that the U.S. should not make any strides to decrease the Nuclear Stockpile in Europe without an 
agreement from Russia providing reductions as well (with the appropriate level of transparency). 
There are counter arguments made that go on to discuss why the U.S. should reduce the stockpile 
regardless, but because of the topic, I’d like to address the bilateral stance that Russia and the 
U.S. should both reduce stockpiles respectively. 
(2011) A Cool App for "Strategic Partnership" with Russia15: In this article, Horlohe 
wrote about a deal between Russia and France, effectively delivering two modern helicopter 
carriers to Russia in 2014. In addition, he talks about how two more warships were going to be 
constructed in Russia. Overall, the author discusses Russia’s acquisition of new weaponry in a 
number of ways. France delivering helicopters to Russia was considered to be the biggest arms 
transfer between a NATO member state and Russia ever. Not only does this set a precedence for 
arms transactions between member states and Russia, but it also makes Russia more dependent 
on Western technology. 
(2012) Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document16: The information 
retrieved from this website is official NATO statistics that pertain to the Partnership for Peace 
program. On this web page, NATO provides a list of countries that have ratified the Partnership 
for Peace and lists the year that the respective country did so. Using this information to back up 
data about Poland’s involvement with the Partnership for Peace is crucial when discussing the 
country’s bilateral cooperation with NATO. 
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(2012) Europe as Seen from Russia17: Baranovsky writes about how Russia is concerned 
by the marginal position given to it in European politics within this article. The issue is that 
Russia views itself as a part of Europe, but is often marginalized by its relationship with the 
West. Both liberal and conservative Russians have different viewpoints as to how Russia should 
be seen in Europe and further integrated with other European countries. Though Russia has 
enough resources to be a self-sufficient power within Europe, the EU is Russia’s largest trade 
partner. The author goes on to talk about how ordinary Russians are connected to center and 
western Europe. He asserts the aspect that ordinary Russians are most concerned with visas and 
travel to other European countries. That being said, further integration of Russia into Europe 
(possibly the EU or NATO) would allow visa free travel. 
(2014) NATO Enlargement and Russia: Discerning Fact from Fiction18: In this work, 
Rühle discusses misconceptions that are often attributed to the relationship between NATO and 
Russia. With Russia’s new aggression regarding NATO enlargement, NATO’s reaction by 
halting the expansion process is seen as a temporary decision. Russia often expresses its 
discontent with the expansion because of the “broken promises” the west made that it wouldn’t 
expand NATO past a unified Germany. Though said, there has never been binding contracts or 
documents that say NATO would not expand past these borders. The article goes on to say that 
Russia has never received a formal invitation to join NATO. These facts however continue to 
distract from the bigger and more important issue at hand: how to create a secure Europe without 
aggravating Russia in the process of enlargement. 
(2015) NATO Enlargement and Russia: Myths and Realities19: In this work, Rühle 
discusses the realities of NATO enlargement with relation to Russia. Several points are made 
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within his work, however one that particularly stood out was the notion that Russia sees NATO 
expansion as a direct threat to its national security. Also, Rühle notes that Russia views NATO 
expansion into Eastern Europe as a “broken promise,” after the reunification of Germany. This 
work is an important source when referring to the actualities of NATO enlargement, and instead 
of answering standard questions about the process, this work brings up many new intricate and 
interesting questions that the reader is left to answer. 
(2016) North European security after the Ukraine conflict20: Within this work, Atland 
discusses the outcome of the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia. Atland views the actions 
taken by Russia to be contentious, as the annexation is not legitimized by the entire international 
community. Reading this work has given me a better understanding of the relationship between 
Russia and Ukraine, as well as the frame of reference NATO holds on the issue. Atland also 
discusses the awareness that Norway, and non-member states, Sweden and Finland, must now 
have with regard to Russia as their eastern neighbor. After the 2014 annexation of Crimea, it is 
obvious that NATO must reassess many aspects of its relationship with Russia. 
Topic Relevance and Research Design 
 
My writing about the topic will revolve around NATO enlargement and Russia’s 
response in the following ways. I intend on initially highlighting the Poland case study. I will 
describe how and why it joined NATO, and then eventually going into detail about the 
international reactions created by its entrance into the alliance. Next, I will highlight the case 
study of the Baltic States. Like the case study on Poland, I will describe how and why the Baltics 
joined NATO, and then go into detail on international reactions to their inclusion. Following suit, 
I will discuss Russia’s reaction to enlargement by highlighting both Georgia and Ukraine, and 
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the actions that have transpired there. After discussing both Georgia’s and Ukraine’s 
involvement with NATO and the actions taken against the two countries by Russia, I will 
conclude the paper with a number of comparable factors that tie the three case studies together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 14 
FIRST ROUND OF NATO ENLARGEMENT: POLAND 
 
Poland Pre-WWII 
 
 Poland had an incredibly unique position in the international community before and after 
World War II. The most notable, and in some regard comprisable, aspect of this country is its 
location within Europe. As one of the largest central European countries, Poland was placed in a 
difficult spot leading up to 1939. With the rising threat of foreign invaders, those in charge of the 
Polish government were forced to sign non-aggression treaties (one of which was in 1934), and 
normalized relations with Poland and Germany for an agreed upon 10 years. This brings to light 
an interesting aspect; what caused Poland to be a theater for conflict in the beginning of World 
War II? To answer this question, we must first analyze the politics and decisions of countries 
surrounding Poland at the time.  
The Soviet Union had undergone drastic industrialization, and had taken on incredible 
amounts of political and economic change since the end of World War I. With a growing 
authoritarian government, the Soviet Union had set it’s aims on expanding westward; increasing 
its influence and dominance over Eastern European states. Not only did this alarm the Polish 
government, but it also caused Poland to look for allies that would come to its aid, given an 
invasion were to occur. After their victory in 1920 against the Soviet Union, Poland entered a 
state of military stagnation and deflation, regarding original equipment made domestically. 
Poland was equipped with French World War I military equipment, making it difficult for 
Germany or the Soviet Union to take unilateral action against the state. Poland spent time 
developing their air force from the years 1925 – 1936 and enacted the six-year plan, which aimed 
to develop the military into a force that could defend against foreign invaders. The six-year plan, 
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however, was happening simultaneously when Hitler invaded the Rhine Province and openly 
denunciated the stipulation of the Versailles treaty, limiting Germany’s military. Poland had 
struggled for centuries to preserve its national identity; what it means to be Polish. In 1939, 
Smigly-Rydz, a Polish statesman and commander-in-chief, said this in an interview: “We have 
learnt from experience what it means to live without freedom, and we are ready to die rather than 
lose it again.” As mentioned prior, the history of Poland is one in which people struggle to 
preserve their national identity and culture under an alien rule, and took every available 
opportunity to regain full independence21. 
However, Poland’s unique geography within Europe makes it difficult to preserve their 
full independence. Bordering two of the most powerful European countries in the 1930’s, Poland 
was not left with many options other than siding with the Western European powers and 
preparing their military for combat. In 1939, Germany began setting its aims on invading Poland. 
Though Hitler was confident that the status quo would remain (Britain and France holding the 
notion of appeasement), he feared that the Soviet Union might come to Poland’s aid, should 
Germany invade. That same year, Germany signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union 
(the Ribbentrop – Molotov Pact), declaring that the two countries would remain in a state of non-
combat with one another. However, a secret stipulation of this treaty divided Poland into an East 
and West portion, two halves that would be occupied by the Soviet Union and Germany 
respectively. With the German invasion finally occurring in early September, Poland was able to 
mobilize about a million soldiers to fight. However, the force of the Polish military was not able 
to fend off the force of Germany. The Polish armed forces hoped to hold out in Warsaw until an 
offensive could be staged against Germany in the west, however the Soviet Union invaded 
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Poland and the country fell. Once Poland’s government and military leaders fled the state, 
Germany and the Soviet Union signed an agreement outlining the territory each country would 
occupy. Yet again in history, Poland was partitioned by more powerful foreign invaders. 
Poland Post-WWII 
 
After World War II, Western Europe was in shambles and a bipolar system emerged. The 
two great powers left in the international community were the United States and the Soviet 
Union. With influence split down Central Europe, the Soviet Union was in complete control of 
Poland. The formation of the Warsaw pact was directly met with the formation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Poland was under the direct influence of a communist 
government22. This was simply the continuation of the Polish people’s occupation of another 
foreign entity, one that did not represent the population within the state. Though an authoritarian, 
communist regime until the 1989 revolutions, Poland played a significant role (if not the most 
important part) in bringing about the downfall of communism in Eastern Europe (and in turn, the 
Soviet Union). 
Poland was notorious for fostering intelligent classes of people who sought to bring about 
free thought and national culture into everyday life. During the Cold War, the west gave heavy 
support to Polish dissidents fighting for human rights and freedom within the Soviet Bloc. 
Programs such as ‘Radio Free Europe’ kept hope alive in communist countries during the Cold 
War and would consistently encourage change23. Lech Walesa, the Polish politician who founded 
Solidarity and would later become the state’s first president, said this about Radio Free Europe: 
“The degree of the Radios’ impact cannot even be described. Would there be earth without the 
sun?” Though Poland was under communist and military rule (martial law during the 1970s), the 
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Polish people never stopped fighting their oppressors and calling for change. During the early 
1970s, Solidarity was founded; the first non-communist trade union within the Soviet Union. 
This was an incredible step in the direction of democracy because it allowed for a significant 
amount of interaction with non-communist countries. It can be referred to as the beginning of the 
end of communism, as Gorbachev began implementing policies such as Perestroika and Glasnot; 
reforms that increasingly liberalized Eastern European countries within the Warsaw Pact. 
The west saw Poland as an opportunity to begin transitioning Eastern European countries 
into democracies. Continuing with the fall of communism in Poland and the fall of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, Poland became a prime candidate for NATO membership. In 1999, the state 
became a full member, strengthening the west’s grip on Europe, while simultaneously weakening 
the newly formed Russian Federation. Poland looked for the west’s guidance during the 1990s, 
as the state sought to transition into a full democracy and become a full participating member of 
the international community. In the coming sections, Poland’s acceptance into NATO will be 
analyzed, along with the international reaction of its entrance and the implications its 
membership implies. 
Mutual Interest in Membership 
 
Poland, at the continental cross roads of Europe, needed a guaranteed security alliance 
with more powerful countries if the state were to have any hope of remaining independent. 
Though after the Cold War, it seemed as though great strides of imperialism were coming to an 
end. While this may be true in many aspects, there isn’t any reason why Poland shouldn’t have 
looked for opportunities to remain sovereign and independent. The initial assumption was that 
NATO expansionism would remain as east as the newly reunified German state. However, after 
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several talks during the 1990s, Poland and other Eastern European countries quickly became the 
point of focus for additions to the collective security alliance. However, Poland is a particular 
case when discussing expanding the NATO sphere of influence. Geographically positioned in the 
center of Europe and bordering several countries that were a part of the Warsaw Pact, Poland 
holds many unique traits that give the west a strong foothold in Eastern Europe, given the state 
becomes allies with western countries. Not only is Poland a prime candidate in Europe to 
become a member of NATO, but the state benefits tremendously from the alliance as well. As a 
country that was, as mentioned before, occupied by foreign invaders for centuries, Poland revels 
at the idea of having a strong sense of security against its powerful neighbors. Both becoming 
stronger allies with western countries and gaining a more secure foothold as a sovereign country 
could be achieved through Poland joining NATO. 
As mentioned before, NATO was an organization that gave Poland the opportunity to 
secure itself from outside invaders for one of the first times in history. There are a couple of 
factors that made NATO particularly appealing to the state. A major factor was the aspect of 
collective security. As a country located in Central Europe, Poland has several neighbors that 
possess incredibly strong military capabilities and have tried to invade in the past. Entering a 
collective security agreement with world powers, such as the United States, allows for Poland to 
focus less on defense, and more on internal issues24. In addition to that point, joining NATO 
allows for Poland to advance its military capabilities. When Poland was a member of the 
Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union stationed nuclear missiles and advanced weaponry within its 
borders. After the Pact dissolved, there were agreements in the early 2000s to remove all nuclear 
weapons from Poland. As a member of NATO (and based on its geography), Poland plays a 
 19 
significant role regarding its possession of weaponry. Should countries that are not a part of 
NATO attack an Eastern European member state, Poland would be one of the first member states 
to retaliate. Even though being a member of NATO does not prevent a conflict from occurring, it 
deters potential conflicts because of the immense support member states receive from one 
another25. In addition, Poland joining NATO fosters a new set of connections with western 
countries. After Poland joined the alliance, there was an increase in trade between the country 
and other member states. This can be seen in a positive light; the more Poland and western 
countries become more inclusive regarding their relations, the more secure Poland becomes. 
As for NATO, Poland was a prime candidate for membership due to several factors: 
geographic location, historical events, and national Polish tradition. The first factor, and arguably 
the most important, is Poland’s position within Europe. Bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine 
(all states that are not members of NATO), Poland has a unique place within Europe. All three of 
those Eastern European neighbors that were mentioned have increasingly moved away from 
becoming members of NATO. That being said, Poland’s geographic position within Europe 
makes it one of the most important members of the alliance. Another factor is Poland’s history 
with its more powerful neighbors. As mentioned before, Poland has a history of being invaded, 
occupied and partitioned by stronger military powers. As an alliance that exists to defend its 
members, NATO saw Poland as a prime candidate because the state wanted membership26. The 
last factor, taking some aspects of the previous factor, is the notion that Poland wants to be 
independent. Poland becoming a member of NATO allowed for the government to focus on 
creating the unique Polish identity, without having to worry about fending off invasions from 
more powerful countries. 
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The Road to Membership 
 
Yet with NATO membership comes constraints and obligations. There is more at work 
than simply a structure preventing war within the region (and globally). As a country that joins 
the collective security organization, there are certain steps taken to ensure the fluid transition 
from non-member state to member state. However, with the benefits that come from entering 
NATO, there are also concessions that must be made. Poland’s entry into NATO was a warm 
reassurance that the organization was succeeding. Having had joined the alliance in 1999 (along 
with the Czech Republic and Hungary), Poland had already participated in several NATO 
agreements such as, but not limited to, the Partnership for Peace, the Individual Partnership 
Program and joint military exercises27. Within the first 10 years of the Warsaw Pact’s 
dissolution, Poland had already invested in joint ventures with NATO and became a member 
state. 
The first of the bilateral agreements between NATO and other European countries was 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP), launched in 1994. This program involved bilateral cooperation 
between individual Euro-Atlantic partner countries and NATO. This allowed for partners to 
build relationships with NATO, while simultaneously choosing their own priorities for 
cooperation28. Levels of cooperation varied amongst states, normally including military training 
exercises, disaster planning and response, policy planning, and environmental issues. In Poland’s 
case particularly, the state wanted to focus on pressing issues, given the political climate right 
after the fall of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Poland sought to 
emphasize the modernization of air defense and interoperability of command and control 
systems. Through the Partnership for Peace, the Polish government was able to have talks with 
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NATO regarding a full future membership29. Another agreement that is important to note is the 
Individual Partnership Program (IPP). In 1994, Poland became the first of the PfP countries to 
agree and participate in this program. Like the PfP, the IPP was an individual program centered 
at forging relations between NATO and non-member states through directed and tailored joint 
efforts. As mentioned before, Poland and NATO began to collaborate through military exercises 
and advancing Poland’s air defense. Through the IPP, Poland was able to get more needs specific 
collaboration with NATO. Along with the initial programs spearheaded by NATO, becoming a 
member requires years of discussion and agreements prior to formally entering the alliance. 
Regarding Poland’s situation with joining NATO in the first round of enlargement, there 
were many roundtable discussions and meetings between the leadership of NATO and the 
government. However, after the first wave of enlargement, NATO created a set of guidelines that 
must be met by countries, prior to their admittance. A Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a set of 
criteria that the country needs to fulfill to show its process reforming several key sectors. These 
sectors include, but are not limited to, the military, foreign policy, domestic policy, and territorial 
disputes. MAP countries are required to upgrade their military to NATO standards and 
demonstrate that their forces are under democratic control. They are required to settle ethnic and 
religious disputes by peaceful means and demonstrate their commitment to human rights and rule 
of law. Countries must also ensure that any domestic legislation won’t pose any obstacles in their 
cooperation with NATO. MAPs that are given to countries are created specifically for each state. 
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Russia’s Reaction to Poland’s Membership with NATO 
 
Poland’s involvement with NATO made a serious impact on the international 
community, changing the security structure of many institutions and effecting the manner in 
which defensive security was treated in Europe. Poland’s geographically strategic placement as a 
country gave NATO an advantage within Europe. As a past member of the Warsaw Pact, the 
necessity for Poland to become a more western country was evident. The state borders Ukraine 
and the Baltics, outlining the importance for NATO membership. This brings surfaces an 
incredibly pertinent question, though: What was Russia’s reaction to Poland joining NATO in 
1999? This question, in and of itself, is extremely complex and does not have a single answer 
(though there are tones that are common). 
In the years leading to Poland’s entry into NATO, Russia assumed that the United States 
spearheading NATO expansion was a foreign policy initiative directed at securing interests in 
Eastern Europe30. While this holds true to date (that NATO is an arm of the United States aimed 
at projecting influence in Eastern Europe), it’s necessary to note that Russia felt a deep distrust 
for the United States during the 1990s. After coming out a victor in the Cold War, the United 
States was in the position to continue to look at various ways the state could assert influence in 
regions. That being said, it’s obvious why Russia would oppose NATO expansion in Eastern 
Europe, as Russia no longer had a grip on its sphere of influence (i.e. Former Soviet states). Why 
would Russia have an issue with NATO expansion if the state no longer had hegemonic 
aspirations within the region? The answer to that question is given by asking the inverse: why 
does the west have any interest in Polish security if they are not threatened by Russia31? Those 
two questions raise possibly the most significant point of this entire chapter. The point is not that 
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the United States is concerned with Polish security. The issue that is raised from Poland joining 
NATO (in Russia’s opinion) is that the United States, Russia’s main contender for decades, is in 
charge of a major security alliance, who’s borders are advancing towards Russia’s western 
border. While the United States may care for the security, autonomy, and implementation of 
democracy in Poland, the state knew that Russia was in any place or position to begin reasserting 
itself as the dominant hegemon in the region. That being said, using the events of history as an 
alibi for expanding influence in Eastern Europe was a strategic step in the direction of regional 
hegemony for the United States. So, how did Russia react to Poland joining NATO? Well, 
Russia reacted poorly to NATO’s first enlargement, but there was nothing of significance that 
could be done. Dating back to the “2+4” negotiations, Russia’s government accepted that a 
reunified Germany would be within NATO. Though it was never officially recorded or written in 
any documentation, Russia was under the impression that NATO expansionism would not extend 
past the newly unified Germany. The fact that NATO expansionism was now going to extend to 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary made Russia feel betrayed. Insulted and left with 
dismay, Russia now saw what was happening as a direct threat to their security within Eastern 
Europe. It’s impossible to categorize the expansion of NATO as anything short of weakening 
Russian influence within the region32. With that being said, the decision to begin enlargement 
was a serious blow to the United States having any chance of developing a strategic partnership 
with Russia at that time. 
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SECOND ROUND OF NATO ENLARGEMENT: THE BALTICS 
 
The Baltics Pre-WWII 
 
 The previous chapter included a brief account of Poland’s history (before World War 
Two (WWII), after WWII, after the break of the Soviet Union, and its relationship with the 
international community (most notably with Russia and NATO). It was made apparent that 
Poland’s geographic and historical significance were prime factors in both NATO and Russia’s 
struggle for influence in the region. That being said, Poland was not the last country to play an 
important role in deciding influential authority in the region. After NATO’s enlargement in 
1999, the next round took place in 2004, consisting of Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
and most notably, the Baltic states, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia33. The Baltics play an 
important part regarding NATO’s influence in Eastern Europe, primarily because two of the 
three states border Russia. Though Poland had a significant role in extending NATO’s influence 
into Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics push the security alliance’s borders against the 
western most expanse of Russia’s territory. This chapter will primarily analyze the following 
aspects of the Baltics. The first section will contain a brief history of the Baltic states before and 
after WWII, and their role in the international community after they became independent states 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The next section will include the path that the 
Baltic states took to become members of NATO, why they did so, and reactions from the 
international community. With finalizing the chapter, the relationship, since their admittance into 
the security alliance in 2004, between the Baltics, NATO, and Russia will be analyzed. 
 The Baltic states have been a crossroads for conflict in several ways since the beginning 
of the 20th century. Like Poland, the three countries have always experienced oppression and 
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occupation from more powerful neighbors. It wasn’t until the 1920s, that the Baltics gained their 
independence from Czarist Russia and neighboring powers34. Though independent states were 
formed, the countries still suffered pressure from outside forces. For example, Lithuania was 
invaded by Poland in 1920, and relations between the two countries did not increase for most of 
the interwar period. The Baltic states experienced relative autonomy throughout the 1920s and 
1930s, yet existed in constant awareness that invasion from a more powerful outside force could 
occur. It becomes apparent, when comparing Poland with the Baltics, that the two entities have 
similar characteristics that will inevitably lead them down the same path of joining NATO. 
Leading into the late 1930s, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia faced the end of their short lived 
independent states. The signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939 divided Eastern 
European countries between Germany and the Soviet Union35. Within this agreement between 
the Nazis and the Soviets, the Baltic states were placed into the Soviet Union’s sphere of 
influence. In 1940, the Soviet Union invaded Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, installing pro-
Soviet, communist governments in all three countries. During WWII, the Baltics were invaded 
by Nazi Germany when they broke the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. The 
populations of these states faced mass oppression, involving deportations, mass arrests, and 
executions.  
The Baltics Post-WWII 
 
After WWII ended and German occupation ended, the allies agreed that the Baltics would 
be placed within the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence once again. These states then became a 
part of the Soviet Union, and more so, a part of the Warsaw Pact. As stated in the previous 
chapter, the Warsaw Pact was a collective security alliance that directly countered NATO36. The 
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Baltic countries, like Poland, are historically prone to outside invasion by more powerful foreign 
invaders. This alliance did not assure the three states that they would be protected from further 
exploitation. Their involvement simply meant a continuation of their exploitation from outside 
forces. This fact further asserts the reasons that the Baltics inevitably sought to become members 
of NATO, a security alliance that could thwart historically oppressive invaders. Throughout the 
Cold War period, the Baltic states experienced sovietization, ranging from the collectivization of 
farms to the mass deportation of people within the Baltic population. While these states were 
occupied, diplomats from the previous governments of the Baltics resided within the United 
States, acting as liaisons and represented the legitimate concerns of the Baltic peoples37. Leading 
into the 1980s, massive protests and civil unrest took place in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. 
Most notably in 1989, a two-million-person human chain stretched from Tallinn to Vilnius38. 
This was to show the unity of the Baltic peoples; those that would rise up against and fight 
oppression. Amid the mass protests and discontent populations within the Baltics, the Soviet 
Union knew that losing control of the three states was inevitable39. In 1991, the Soviet Union 
collapsed, recognizing Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia as independent states. The last of the 
Soviet troops did not leave the Baltics until 1994, though40. 
 The Baltic states, now having recognized sovereignty and independence within the 
international community, aimed to become integral members of international organizations and 
security structures. Immediately after they regained their independence, the Baltic states joined 
the United Nations in 1991. This was done through a simple adoption through the general 
assembly41. More importantly, however, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia sought to become 
members of the European Union and NATO. Two organizations that are at forefront of European 
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integration, if the Baltics wanted to become more of European countries and to deviate from 
being under the direct influence of Russia, the three states had to quickly find the best paths to 
joining both NATO and the European Union. This being said, the European Union and NATO 
both wanted the Baltics to become members of their respective institutions. There are several 
reasons that NATO saw the Baltic states as increasingly valuable assets, and vice versa (the 
Baltics seeing NATO as a valuable asset). Viewed as nothing more than an integral part of the 
Soviet Union and Czarist Russia by the outside world, the Baltics development and integration 
into more European institutions changed their role in the international community42. The next 
sections will evaluate the paths by which the Baltics became members of NATO, the reasons that 
the three states were seen as valuable candidates for NATO, the main reasons that NATO was a 
security alliance that would fulfill the needs of the Baltics, and international reactions from the 
Baltic states admission into NATO. 
The Road to Membership 
 
 Though these three countries were not exactly in identical positions throughout their 
journey toward NATO membership, the problems they faced were particularly similar, and their 
struggles toward improving their economies, military structures, and national security were 
characterized by the same goal. Attempts of European integration for the Baltic states proved to 
be accepted with open arms. After Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia declared their independence, 
the three countries inherited devastated economies and military structures that were in poor 
quality43. Strides to improve their economies and military structures were almost immediate, in 
part because the Baltic states saw the necessities of active reforms as direct paths to NATO 
membership. After the 1999 round of enlargement, that incorporated the Czech Republic, 
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Hungary, and Poland, the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was launched (mentioned in the 
previous chapter). This program was designed to give aspiring member countries a pathway into 
NATO membership, as well as assistance to fulfill the requirements candidate states needed to 
meet44. A key component of each MAP given to the Baltics, with regard to the requirements 
states needed to meet, was the assurance that each state could contribute to the organization’s 
defense and ensure territorial national sovereignty. The latter proved to be quite simple – Russia 
was not in any position to reclaim the Baltics via military intervention before their admittance in 
2004. In addition, Russia saw its relationship with NATO as one that needed to be improved and 
fostered, not tarnished by acts of imperialism (this will be expanded upon later in the chapter). 
As for defense, all three countries decided on comprehensive plans with relation to their 
organization of their forces45. Using western institutions and NATO military structuring as a 
jumping off point, the Baltics organized defense configurations by developing capable land self-
defense forces (through the use of training facilities, peace and wartime logistic systems, and 
updated equipment for land forces). The Baltic states saw the necessity to modernize their 
militaries and make them capable of training and operating with NATO forces46. As past 
members of the Partnership for Peace, NATO assisted the Baltic states with policy planning, 
disaster planning and response, and most notably, military-to-military cooperation. Mentioned 
previously in this chapter, the Baltics joined NATO in 2004. However, here were multiple 
factors that played a hand in their accession. Timing, being one factor, gave the Baltic countries 
a huge leg up on states such as Georgia and Ukraine. Although aspiring states such as Georgia 
and Ukraine were (and still are) in line for NATO membership, both states had not met minimum 
requirements to join the security alliance. The Baltic states were able to quickly turn to the West 
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and mirror democratic institutions, such as free elections and market economies47. Due to this 
factor, Latvia, Lithuania, and notably, Estonia, were able to more quickly meet the requirements 
outlined in their MAPs. Another factor that contributed to the Baltic states expedience with 
joining NATO, was the strategic positioning that NATO would gain if Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia became members. While these countries did all reform rather quickly, the interest that 
NATO had with sharing a border with Russia cannot go unnoticed. The next section will delve 
into the reasons that NATO was an ideal international organization for the Baltics, and why the 
Baltics were prime candidates for NATO. 
Mutual Interest in Membership 
 
 There are several ways to view why NATO valued the Baltics as credible and necessary 
members for the security alliance. An initial, and more secondary reason, that the Baltics were 
prime candidate states for NATO was the fact that they were able to meet the requirements that 
NATO set to become members. Stemming from the reality that the Baltics saw NATO 
membership as a route into stability and ensured security from outside military threats, the three 
countries took it upon themselves to begin making reforms. Beginning second generation 
reforms included judicial and tax reform, budgetary and policymaking transparency, etc.; all 
necessary to move forward with democratic transitions48. This choice both modernized the 
Baltics and made offering the three countries a bid easier for NATO. 
Mentioned in the previous chapter about Poland, geopolitics play an enormous role in 
shaping international security and influence. Estonia and Latvia lie on Russia’s western border, 
and Lithuania bordering Belarus, making the three countries incredibly valuable partners for 
combating encroaching Russian influence in Eastern Europe. NATO was created to counter the 
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Warsaw Pact (as mentioned in the previous chapter). After its dissolution, the security alliance 
gathered the purpose of fighting international terrorism and protecting smaller, for the most part 
European, countries from foreign threats. It would only seem natural for the international 
organization to incorporate the Baltic states, seeing as they are three former soviet republics and 
act as a gateway into sharing a board with Russia. Similar to the first round of NATO 
enlargement, NATO was gaining countries that move its border farther east. Admitting the 
Baltics into NATO directly benefited the organization in two ways: Russia lost the ability/option 
of exerting military pressure on the Baltics and gave NATO the ability to build military bases in 
countries that share a border with Russia. The factor of the Baltic state’s location now played an 
enormous role in NATO’s geopolitical influence. 
 Continuing on the topic of the Baltics providing a better geostrategic positioning for 
NATO, the military presence that the west was now able to exert in Eastern Europe increased 
significantly. Surpassing the initial assistance that NATO and western countries provided to the 
Baltics prior to admission (regarding updating their military), the 2014 Wales Summit brought 
about the introduction of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). This called for new deterrence 
measures and military procedures, broadly welcomed by the Baltic states49. A stipulation of the 
RAP features a 5000-strong Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) created within the 
NATO Response Force (NRF). Also, the air forces of more than 10 NATO states have been 
heavily involved in patrolling Baltic airspace since 2004. After the 2014 invasion of Crimea, the 
RAP and air patrol by allies was scaled up significantly. The Baltic states have made it apparent 
that they would prefer permanent military presences within their countries, as the RAP involves 
a “response” mechanism to threats, after they occur. It is interesting to note that one of the core 
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beliefs that Russia held about the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, is that there would be no 
military build-up along the Eastern European border. That would include military bases and 
permanent military personnel. However, the act does not prohibit the establishment of permanent 
NATO bases in Central and Eastern Europe50. Russia’s involvement with the entirety of the 
Baltic inclusion will be touched upon later in this chapter, but for now, the comparison should be 
made between what Russia “thought” about the Founding Act of 1997 and NATO enlargement 
in general. Just as Russia was made an empty promise that NATO would not expand past a 
reunified Germany, the notion that there would be no permanent military buildup along Eastern 
Europe is also not true. On that note, Russia accused the United States of violating a peace treaty 
between Moscow and NATO, after the United States sent new military forces to the Baltic 
region51. This is due to the fact that Russia has been increasing its military presence along its 
western border with the Baltics. The result of both NATO and Russia militarizing their borders? 
a security dilemma. 
Russia’s Reaction to The Baltic States’ Membership with NATO 
 
 So, what was Russia’s reaction from the Baltics states joining NATO? Has Russia taken 
action against the Baltics since their admittance into the security alliance? Well, immediately 
prior to their accession, Russian leaders declared that Baltic entry into NATO was the 
metaphorical “line in the sand.” Gennadii Selezev, speaer of the State Duma in Russia, told 
journalists that Baltic admission into NATO would require Russia to review its part in the 
Founding Act of 199752. In attempts to persuade the Baltics from joining NATO, Yeltsin offered 
multiple security initiatives to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with the intention of creating 
mutual agreements that would follow in suit. This ended up failing and pushed the Baltics further 
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into talks of accession with NATO. It was obvious that Russia was going to do everything in its 
power to keep the Baltics in its sphere of influence. Evidence of this was shown by Russia’s 
reluctance to withdraw troops from the Baltic states (after the collapse of the Soviet Union), a 
strong reluctance to give up control of military instillations, attempts to retain control of a 
corridor to Kaliningrad through Lithuania, and a refusal to sign border agreements for a certain 
amount of time53. This was an important turning point for Russia, seeing as NATO expanded 
farther into Eastern Europe and against Russia’s western border, directly against the wishes of 
Moscow. Remaining on the subject of Russia’s reaction and response to Baltic NATO 
membership, Russia has indirectly attacked these three countries (as well as others) with the 
purpose of destabilization and misinformation. 
 In 2007, the Estonian government decided to remove a statue commemorating Soviet 
soldiers killed in WWII. This was condemned by the Kremlin, but the Estonian government went 
ahead with its removal regardless. After the decision was made, critical portions of Estonia’s 
online media, banking, and government architecture were hit by a wave of digital attacks that 
crashed numerous websites. The 2007 operation also involved misinformation tactics (i.e. users 
were redirected to photos of soviet soldiers or fake news stories). These cyber techniques would 
be redefined in later years during Russia’s attacks on Georgia and Ukraine54. 
 Russian armament along its western border with Estonia, Latvia and Belarus has occurred 
for some time now. However, Moscow planned to send over 100,000 troops and artillery to the 
western border in preparation for war games that are set to take place in 201755. This is military 
build-up is not a response to sanctions placed on Russia by the west, but instead, a show of 
military might. This build up, provocative in nature, causes the Baltics (and NATO) to respond 
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with a mutual armoring on the borders of Estonia and Latvia. Since then, there has been serious 
discussion regarding NATO, the countries that will participate in future rounds of enlargement, 
and Russia’s aggressive foreign policy against aspiring NATO members. 
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RUSSIA’S RESPONSE TO NATO ENLARGEMENT:  
GEORGIA AND UKRAINE 
 
Enlargement after 2004 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, NATO has continued to perform enlargement 
processes that admit states, given they meet the criteria to join the security alliance. This has 
been met with much contention from Russia, as the state sees NATO enlargement as a direct 
threat to their national security, interests in surrounding regions, and foreign policy. Previous 
rounds of enlargement, chiefly in 2004 when seven countries (including the Baltic states) joined 
NATO, have made serious impacts regarding how Russia continued developing militarily and 
interacting with its neighbors. Whereas once Russia had full control over these states, the 2004 
round of enlargement created an uncertainty within Moscow. With the Baltics becoming 
members of NATO, it became a reality that NATO forces and military facilities could place 
themselves on Russia’s western border (shared with the Baltics). This prompted a series of 
responses and decisions by Russia regarding how to continue their foreign policy within the 
region. After the Baltics entered NATO, Russia’s Security Council was called upon to consider 
deploying additional forces to regions bordering NATO members56. During that same time, the 
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Aleksandr Yakovenko, said that “this expansion 
certainly touched upon Russia's political, military and economic interests and hence, Russia 
might have to change its already declared policy of unilaterally demilitarizing the zone around 
the Baltic states.” The Baltic states’ entrance to NATO could be attributed to several factors, one 
of which being their instilled historical fear of Soviet dominance in the region, and their desire to 
remain sovereign and autonomous. With the addition of these new members, the United States 
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had stated that Russia was not the “enemy.” This prompted Russia to adopt a resolution outlining 
the need for NATO to take into account Russia’s opinion on expanding to more Eastern 
European states. While NATO expansionism was still to occur, its transgression would happen 
regardless of Russia’s agreement. A large part of the reason Russia was adamantly against 
NATO’s expansion stems from the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. As contending security 
alliances, it was viable to have both. However, with the Warsaw Pact gone, Russia viewed the 
existence (and expansion) of NATO as both unnecessary and aggressive. The security alliance 
still existed, though, to serve as a vassal in combating other international issues aside from a 
Russian threat, such as terrorism (which Russia experienced as well). Russia still uncomfortable 
with the idea of bases being set up in the Baltics, Russian Defense Minister (at the time) Sergei 
Ivanov argued that Russia should have monitoring facilities set up at the bases to ensure that the 
arms of the NATO facilities pose no threat to Russia’s security. NATO officials denied any 
possibility of this becoming a reality, immediately dismantling any hope of a comfortable 
agreement being made between Russia and the security alliance. Continuing with several other 
disagreements, ranging from defense exercises to air surveillance flights, the accession of the 
Baltic states to NATO further strengthened its Anti-Russian make-up, according to Mikhail 
Margelov, the chairman of the Russian Federation for the Council International Relations 
Committee. 
Two Prospective Candidate States 
 
With the security alliance now comprising 29 member states, there are still several 
countries that are seen as primary candidates for NATO membership. Two of these countries are 
Ukraine and Georgia, located in Eastern Europe and Northwest Asia respectively. These two 
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countries provide strategic locations for NATO influence, partially because of their history and 
size, but most critically due to their shared border with Russia. It’s no secret that Russia strongly 
opposes both of these countries becoming members of NATO, and in the past two decades 
Russia has made several campaigns to derail both Ukraine’s and Georgia’s acquisition of a 
membership action plan. It is critical for Russia to remain a primary influence of these two 
countries because of their geostrategic location, their past history with the federation, and the 
threat that is presented by the two states becoming NATO members. Both Ukraine and Georgia 
were part of the Soviet Union prior to its collapse in 1991, and hold unique, deep ties to Russia. 
Though there have been tremendous strides of collaboration (and possible integration) between 
NATO, Ukraine and Georgia, the last two decades have shown that their membership becoming 
a reality will be plagued with many difficulties, largely presented by Russia. 
In part, the Ukrainian and Georgian paths for NATO membership are problematic for a 
variety of reasons. As stated before, their geography plays a significant part in why both NATO 
and Russia want the ability to project influence over the two countries57. Ukraine, located in 
Central Europe, plays a crucial role as a buffer state between Russia and NATO. After NATO 
enlarged in 2004 and gained the Baltic states, Russia was faced with a reality that NATO could 
have military authority along its north-western border. Russia knew, and still holds the notion, 
that if Ukraine were to become a member of NATO, the ability to exert influence into central 
Europe would drastically decrease. In addition, without influence over Ukraine, Russia loses the 
ability to be European superpower58. Significant portions of Russia’s economy, such as natural 
gas sales, rely on positive relations with Ukraine. Those relations are prone to stress if Ukraine 
were to side with Russia’s competitors. With regards to Georgia, it’s geography is a very 
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important trait that makes the country an interest to both Russia and NATO. It’s a country 
bordering Turkey (a NATO member state), Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. The fact that 
Georgia is not located in Europe, but still shares a border with Russia, is important. The ability 
for NATO to have bases located on the southern border of Russia is paramount to exerting a 
military influence in the region. With Georgia as a member state, NATO and Georgian military 
forces would be able to train and increase the interoperability of defense mechanisms59. On 
Russia’s account, Georgia is a buffer state and an ally. The necessity for Georgia to remain as a 
non-member of NATO is crucial for Russia’s ability to remain a major power in the region. Both 
Ukraine and Georgia are two states that have positive working relationships with NATO, 
however a timeframe for their membership is still a subject of discussion. 
Case Study – Georgia 
 
As a newly independent state from the Soviet Union, Georgia began under the leadership 
of Gamsakhurdia60. Similar to states that had been granted independence after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Georgia’s relationship with NATO began in 1992, when the state joined the 
NATO-run North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Only two years later, Georgia signed the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP). A program that included many other non-member states, the PfP 
allowed for Georgia to begin building a lasting relationship with NATO. Continuing on the path 
of mutual cooperation, Georgia signed their first Individual Partnership Plan in 1996 and opened 
official relations with NATO in 1998. In the early 2000’s, the first joint military exercises 
between Georgia and NATO took place. These were the first steps toward a more in-depth 
integration between the two. Following on this trend of cooperation with the west, 2003 marked 
an important milestone for Georgia; the Rose Revolution. In short, this revolution marked the 
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ending of Soviet leadership in the country, and placed Georgia on a path of promoting western 
institutions, such as NATO. However, with all the mutual collaboration and effort to foster a 
positive relationship that would lead to membership, Georgia has not been offered a Membership 
Action Plan. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty limits membership to countries within 
Europe61. While Turkey is not considered a European country, a portion of the state lies within 
continental Europe. 
In April 2008, the NATO summit in Bucharest occurred. It was here that several 
countries, including the United States, called for Georgia to be allowed to join the Membership 
Action Plan (MAP). After the suggestion was met with opposition from Germany and France, 
the alliance decided not to offer Georgia a MAP because of the possibility it would anger Russia. 
That same month, the head of the Russian military, general Yuri Baluyevsky, stated that “Russia 
will take steps aimed at ensuring its interests along its borders and these will not only be military 
steps, but also steps of a different nature.” Those steps of a different nature consist of aims to halt 
Georgia’s integration into NATO. It was after the summit that the Russian president vowed to 
protect the republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two unrecognized republics within Georgia 
that have a major Russian presence. Later that year, Georgia sent troops into South Ossetia to 
restore constitutional order, but this force met with a much larger Russian assault that extended 
to Abkhazia. Before the war in both regions, rallies were held in two cities, Tskhinvali and 
Sukhumi, where people of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia appealed to the Russian government 
for recognition of their sovereignty62. Once Russia recognized both territories as sovereign states, 
Moscow had legitimate reasons to come to their aid. This made it more difficult for Georgia to 
quell any rebellions and in turn, keep territorial sovereignty. 
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This complicated both NATO – Russian relations, but also NATO – Georgian relations, 
as NATO had peacekeeping troops stationed in both regions. All that said, the war in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia placed Georgia farther away from obtaining NATO membership63. In 
2009, NATO stated that they would pledge to provide their assistance and support for Georgia’s 
reform efforts and it’s recognized territorial integrity. The most recent development between 
Georgia and NATO was a “substantive package” of cooperation measures implemented by 
NATO in 2014. This included defense capacity building, training, and enhanced interoperability 
opportunities for Georgia64. The situation between Georgia, Russia, and NATO is unique 
because of the vital role geography comprises when discussing NATO membership. It’s evident 
that Russia will, to the best of its ability, stop Georgia from obtaining a MAP and joining NATO 
through military and diplomatic means. 
Case Study – Ukraine 
 
With the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine gained its independence and became a 
sovereign state. Similar to Georgia, Ukraine officially began relations with NATO in 1994, when 
the state joined the Partnership for Peace program. There were multiple levels of cooperation and 
partnership leading into the 2000s, such as the creation of a NATO-Ukraine commission in 1997, 
and the Ukrainian president Kuchma’s declaration in 2002 that Ukraine wanted to join NATO. 
However, during this presidency, relations between the United States and Ukraine soured due to 
several scandals that erupted (one of which involving the transfer of a sophisticated Ukrainian 
defense system to Iraq)65. In 2004, the Orange Revolution occurred and replaced Kuchama’s 
government with Yushchenko, a prominent supporter of Ukraine becoming a member of NATO. 
Following suit, the 2008 Bucharest summit resulted in Ukraine not obtaining a Membership 
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Action Plan for various reasons. Both France and Germany disagreed with the potential decision 
to offer Ukraine a MAP because of their need to reform internally (meeting the standards of a 
NATO member), and the impact that offering Ukraine a MAP would have on NATO – Russia 
relations. The Yanukovych presidency marked an interesting time period with regard to Ukraine 
and NATO. The administration held the belief that Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO was 
sufficient and that the country did not need to press joining NATO with urgency66. During this 
presidency, Ukraine declared its status as a non-aligned state and passed a bill that excluded the 
goal of further expediting Ukraine’s membership in NATO, but continued cooperation programs 
with NATO (this included training Ukrainian troops and participating in peacekeeping missions 
in Afghanistan and Iraq). Following suit, the Ukrainian president chose to side with Russia yet 
again regarding an oil deal that would effectively reduce the cost of oil, supplied by Russia, to 
Ukraine by about 33%67. This deal also involved a $15 billion-dollar buyout of Ukrainian 
government bonds provided by Russia to Ukraine, opposing the European Union’s offer of close 
to $1 billion dollars. This deal was made amid massive protests in Ukraine that urged more pro-
European Union integration. Although this deal between Ukraine and Russia was not connected 
to NATO directly, the president’s pro-Russian integration decision making continued to affect 
the relationship between Ukraine and western countries, effectively making NATO-Ukrainian 
relations more difficult to establish. It wasn’t until the Euromaidan in 2014 that Yanukovych fled 
from Ukraine amid massive protests, stemming from Ukrainian dissatisfaction with corruption 
and a lack of European integration, that Ukraine elected a pro-western government. That same 
year, Ukraine set obtaining NATO membership as a priority68. 
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Though Ukraine became a pro-west leaning country in 2014, Russia expressed its 
extreme dissatisfaction with the sudden shift. Russia sees Ukraine as an important ally that 
divides NATO’s border with Russia’s, creating a buffer on the vast expanse of Russia’s western 
territory. It was made public in 2008, after the Bucharest summit, that Russia would target its 
missiles at Ukraine if it joins NATO and accepts the deployment of a missile defense shield69. In 
addition, Vladimir Putin asserted that if Ukraine joined NATO, Russia could contend their 
integration by annexing the Ukrainian East and Crimea. Leading into 2014 with the removal of 
the pro-Russian president Yanukovych, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, as well as began 
military operations in Ukraine’s eastern territories. This was only after Ukraine elected an 
increasingly pro-west president, who called for further Ukrainian – NATO integration. Eastern 
Ukraine has a large population of ethnic Russians. It’s important to note that this population 
supports further integration between Russia and Ukraine. The ideological divisions between 
Eastern Ukraine and Western Ukraine contribute to the reasons Russia was able to justify its 
annexation of Crimea and involvement within Ukraine’s borders. Regarding current efforts taken 
by Ukraine to become a part of NATO, once Ukraine meets and fulfills the standards to join the 
security alliance, the state will hold a referendum to decide if the population would like to move 
further with NATO membership. 
NATO Membership and Russian Intervention 
 
Taking a closer look into this situation, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is 
surprisingly similar to that of the war in South Ossetia. Both conflicts ensued because of Russia’s 
fear that the state was losing its influential grip on Ukraine and Georgia to NATO. It was made 
apparent by member states, such as Germany and France, that the risk of inviting Ukraine and 
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Georgia to join NATO was not worth provoking Russia. The possibility of these two countries 
becoming full members of NATO was drastically hindered following the conflicts that occurred 
with Russia in Crimea and South Ossetia, seeing as they no longer met the NATO standards of 
possessing complete sovereignty over their territory. Could the conflicts between Russia, 
Ukraine and Georgia depict that the reasonable limits of NATO expansion have been reached70? 
It’s become apparent that NATO must decide between a positive relationship with Russia or its 
desired expansion, including Ukraine and Georgia, two states that share a strategic border with 
Russia. 
The idea of Ukraine and Georgia becoming members of NATO is contingent on several 
factors. First and foremost, NATO seeks to only add states that meet the criteria and standards 
that are put forth and outlined in Membership Action Plans. An important stipulation of these 
MAPs dictate that the state must have a concrete grip on their territorial sovereignty. That being 
said, Russia’s aim is to sustain conflicts within Ukraine and Georgia, preventing the two 
countries from joining NATO or the European Union71. It was seen in 2008, with the Russian – 
Georgian war in South Ossetia, and in 2014, with the annexation of Crimea, that membership for 
both Ukraine and Georgia raises a high risk of aggravating Russia and creating military conflict. 
Russia’s modernization and advancement of its military in the past two decades has placed 
western nations and NATO in a difficult position with regard to enlarging NATO. After carefully 
assessing the viability of including both states into the security alliance, it’s evident that future 
conflict could further erupt in Eastern Europe and North-West Asia if NATO continues its goal 
of creating a unified Europe under the security alliance. 
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Table 1. Comparative factors between the three case studies. 
  
 Meeting the 
standards to 
obtain a MAP 
Mutual interest in 
membership: 
NATO and states 
Russian reaction 
to membership/ 
possible 
accession 
Russian 
aggression 
Poland Poland met the 
requirements to obtain 
a MAP rather quickly 
after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. 
Poland sought to 
protect itself from 
foreign aggressors 
through NATO 
membership. NATO 
expanding into central 
Europe was key in 
demonstrating 
territorial influence. 
Russia viewed 
Poland’s accession 
into NATO as an 
insult. There was an 
unspoken agreement 
that NATO borders 
would not expand past 
a reunified Germany. 
Poland has not 
experienced Russian 
military aggression. 
The country has, 
however, experienced 
Russian 
misinformation 
campaigns. 
The Baltics The Baltic states 
suffered economically 
and militarily after the 
fall of the Soviet 
Union, but were able 
to democratize 
quicker than expected. 
The Baltic states saw 
NATO membership as 
a key resource in 
keeping Russia from 
making military 
advances (Article 5). 
NATO viewed Baltic 
accession as a way to 
share a border with 
Russia. 
Russia saw Baltic 
membership in NATO 
as a direct threat to 
their national security. 
With a Western 
military alliance on 
the northwestern 
border, Russia has 
increased their 
military presence 
along the shared 
border with Latvia 
and Estonia. 
The Baltic states have 
witnessed a large 
Russian military 
presence along the 
eastern borders of 
Latvia and Estonia. 
This is due to their 
membership with 
NATO. 
Ukraine and 
Georgia 
Ukraine and Georgia 
are two countries that 
are heavily influenced 
by Russia. They 
currently do not meet 
the necessary 
requirements due to 
territorial instability 
and Article 10. 
Both Ukraine and 
Georgia want to 
become members of 
NATO. However, in 
order to prevent 
Russian aggression, 
those countries have 
not been offered 
MAPs. 
Moscow has made it 
apparent that they 
would not allow 
Ukraine and Georgia 
to become members 
of NATO. Either 
through military 
action (which has 
been seen) or other 
means, their 
membership in the 
security alliance is 
where Russia draws 
the line. 
Ukraine and Georgia 
have experienced 
Russian military 
aggression due to their 
geographic nature and 
increased 
collaboration with 
NATO. 
 
Comparative 
Factors 
Case 
Studies 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Over the past two decades, NATO enlargement has shifted the tide of European power 
dynamics within the international community. The cases studies that I’ve analyzed in this paper 
show a direct correlation between NATO expanding into Eastern Europe and an increase in 
Russian antagonism. Though there are other countries that have an extensive working 
relationship with NATO, the case studies that I’ve used proved to be the most descriptive with 
answering the research question, stated at the beginning. The chart above depicts a few of the 
factors that apply to all three of the case studies I’ve written about in this paper. Comparing 
Poland, the Baltic states, and Ukraine and Georgia with these factors yields for a more 
summarized understanding of their connection to NATO and Russia. 
Poland 
 
The first case study that I analyzed, Poland, became a sovereign country after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. This country, along with the Czech Republic and Hungary, was 
involved in the first round of NATO enlargement in 1999. Due to Poland’s rapid democratization 
and stable economy, this country was able to obtain a MAP and begin its integration into NATO 
rather quickly. Compared to other countries that were seeking NATO membership at the time, 
Poland was a particularly important player in Central Europe due to its geostrategic positioning. 
Poland’s hasty accession into NATO paved the road ahead for countries such as the Baltic states 
to be next in line for membership. 
Regarding both the interests of Poland and NATO, membership within the security 
alliance suited Poland’s needs and advanced the goals of NATO. As stated earlier in my paper, 
Poland was under the direct influence of Russia for most of the 20th century. After the break-up 
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of the Soviet Union, it was in Poland’s best interest to become a member of NATO in order to 
prevent future Russian bellicosity. As a country that sought to retain its sovereignty, the best 
option was to side with the West. The leadership of NATO was interested in expanding more 
into Central Europe. Russian imperialism and aggression in the 20th century enveloped all of 
Eastern Europe and most of Central Europe. With the Warsaw Pact dissolved, and Russia forced 
to retreat from Central Europe, it was in NATOs best interest to expand eastward, pushing its 
border of collective security closer to Russia. 
Russia’s reaction to NATO enlargement into Central Europe was met with contention. As 
stated earlier in this paper, there was an unspoken agreement that NATO membership would not 
expand past a reunified Germany, father into Eastern Europe. As the first round of enlargement 
progressed, there were major changes that had to be made regarding Russia’s foreign policy. One 
of which, was that Russia, soon after, viewed NATO enlargement as a direct threat to national 
security. Facing the reality that a key geostrategic country in Central Europe was now a member 
of a Western lead security alliance, Russia made it clear that there would be repercussions if 
eastward expansion continued. 
Since becoming a member of NATO, Poland has not experienced direct Russian 
belligerence. Unlike the Baltic states, Georgia and Ukraine, Poland has not been threatened by 
Russian military action, or fallen victim to cyberattacks. The only Russian retaliation that Poland 
has experienced from joining NATO is small misinformation campaigns, and government 
interference. Russian lead misinformation campaigns are prevalent in most countries that cannot 
be directly influenced by Russia and are allied with Western institutions (like NATO). Poland 
has had pro-Russian officials enter positions of power, such as in the Ministry of Defense. These 
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actions taken by Russia against Poland, however, are not as significant as those taken against the 
Baltics, Georgia and Ukraine. 
The Baltic States 
 
The second case study that was analyzed within this paper, the Baltic States, became 
sovereign countries after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The second round of enlargement 
(since the reunification of Germany) included Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and of 
course, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The Baltic States were able to receive MAPs rather 
quickly, as they democratized shortly after the break of the Soviet Union. The only factor that 
was theoretically able to hinder the chances of the three countries receiving MAPs was Russia’s 
reaction. 
Regarding both the interests of the Baltic States and NATO, both parties stood to benefit 
from membership. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were all part of the Soviet Union prior to its 
collapse. In searching for avenues to maintain their territorial sovereignty, NATO membership 
presented itself to be the greatest asset. As members of a collective security alliance, the Baltics 
would have the authority to invoke Article 5 (i.e. calling on the other members of NATO to 
assist) if militarily provoked. This is arguably the most important reason for NATO membership, 
when discussing smaller Eastern European countries. If Russia were to take military action on 
any three of the Baltic countries, they would be able to call upon other members for assistance. 
Regarding NATOs interest in adding the Baltics to the security alliance, doing so pushes its 
borders against Russia’s western front. Latvia and Estonia share a border with Russia in the 
northwest. Once members of NATO, Latvia and Estonia would be able to build western lead 
military bases on land that connects with Russia. 
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Russia’s reaction to the Baltic States joining NATO was extremely negative. The Baltic 
States accession into the security alliance was perceived by as a direct threat to national security. 
Not only were the Baltic states now out of Russia’s sphere of influence, but the United States and 
Western European countries were now able to build NATO military bases in Latvia, Estonia, and 
Lithuania. The connecting of both NATO and Russian borders was seen by Moscow as a 
complete overstepping of boundaries and unequal. 
In response, Russia has taken several actions over the past decade. In 2007, Estonia 
experienced a large scale cyberattack from Russia that disabled crucial banking systems and 
government websites. Instead, when Estonians tried to visit certain government websites, they 
would be redirected to pro-Russian propaganda. Cyber warfare is one of the many tools that 
Russia uses in misinformation campaigns. This was extraordinarily powerful because it disrupted 
an entire economy, making the cyberattack more impactful than a mere propaganda wave. In 
recent years, Russia has begun building a large military presence of hundreds of thousands of 
soldiers, artillery, and tanks on its northwestern border with Estonia and Latvia. This is directly 
in response to NATO building military instillations and running drills within the Baltic states. 
This type of military buildup inevitably causes a security dilemma, and a further escalation of 
tensions. 
Georgia and Ukraine 
 
The third case study analyzed within this paper was Georgia and Ukraine. These two 
countries have always been, and continue to be, under direct influence from Russia. Due to 
several factors, both countries have not yet received MAPs. At the Bucharest Summit in 2008, 
NATO was considering offering Georgia and Ukraine MAPs, however the notion was contested 
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by several Western European countries. In an effort to not provoke Russia, the two countries had 
to wait more time before they received a course for membership. Though Ukraine and Georgia 
may not have received their MAPs for several reasons, the first and foremost factor considered 
was Russia’s possible response. 
Regarding a mutual interest of membership between NATO, Georgia and Ukraine, 
membership would be extremely beneficial for all parties involved. If Georgia and Ukraine were 
to become members of NATO, they would no longer have to fear military action from Russia. 
Though the threat would always be present, the response to Russian military intervention would 
be countered by Article 5 and in turn, the full force of NATO. Like the Baltics and other small 
European countries that do not have the resources to fend off Russia’s military, Georgia and 
Ukraine would benefit tremendously from the security alliance aspect. NATO also stands to 
benefit greatly from Georgia and Ukraine joining the alliance, specifically because of the shared 
border with Russia. NATOs border would then comprise most of Russia’s western front, as well 
as a stretch of land on the south. 
Russia’s reaction to the possibility of Georgia and Ukraine joining the alliance was made 
apparent through military action. In 2008, Russia invaded regions in Georgia. In 2014, Russia 
invaded eastern Ukraine and annexed the Crimean Peninsula. Through these military invasions 
and land grabs, Russia destabilized the territorial sovereignty of both Georgia and Ukraine. A 
key and necessary aspect of NATO membership states that in order to receive a MAP, a country 
must have complete territorial sovereignty over its borders. Through invading both Ukraine and 
Georgia, Russia ensured that these two countries will not be applicable to receive a MAP in the 
foreseeable future. 
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